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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION VS. FREE-
DOM OF ASSOCIATION-THE LIMITS OF TITLE VII APPLICABILITY TO
PARTNERSHIP ADMISSION IN THE MODERN LAW FIRM-Hishon v.
King & Spalding-On May 22, 1984, the Supreme Court held
that a female associate employed by a major Atlanta law firm
had stated a cause of action against the firm for sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' after the
firm had denied the associate admission to the partnership. The
case, Hishon v. King & Spalding, centered on the conflict be-
tween an individual's right, pursuant to Title VII, to attain an
occupational position commensurate with her abilities, and the
right of individuals to freely form business partnerships as pro-
tected by the implied right of freedom of association under the
first amendment of the Constitution.3 The Court's holding in
Hishon, however, hinged on the contractual obligations between
the parties.4 The Court left unanswered the critical question of
whether thousands of large and medium-sized law firms
throughout the country, which have partnership selection proce-
dures different from those of King & Spalding, can claim an ex-
emption from Title VII when selecting new partners.5 The nar-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1982).
2. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984).
3. See generally 104 S. Ct. 2229.
4. Id. at 2233-34.
5. Id. at 2231-36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) provides that it shall be an unlawful employ-
ment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
Section 2000e-5(a) which relates to enforcement of Title VII, provides in part:
(a) The [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] is empowered as
hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any un-
lawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 . . . of this
title
(b) Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
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row scope of the Hishon decision leaves a great many women
and minorities, in the legal as well as other professional fields,
unprotected under a wide variety of circumstances from invidi-
ous employment discrimination on the basis of race or sex.' This
comment will explore the limitations of the Hishon decision as
well as the legal and social ramifications which may result from
those limitations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Hishon, the petitioner alleged sex discrimination by the
respondent law firm after the firm denied her admission to the
partnership and notified her to seek employment elsewhere pur-
suant to the firm's "up or out" policy.7 The petitioner claimed
that the relationship between a partner and a large institutional
law firm8 such as the respondent, is primarily one of employ-
aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an em-
ployer ... has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Com-
mission shall serve a notice of the charge . . . on such employer . . .
(hereinafter referred to as the "respondent") within ten days, and shall
make an investigation thereof. . . . Charges shall not be made public
by the Commission. If the Commission determines after such investiga-
tion that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true, it shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claim-
ing to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action . . . . If the Com-
mission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor
to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by infor-
mal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion . ..
(f) If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or
within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to
secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any re-
spondent not a government, governmental agency or political subdivi-
sion named in the charge. ...
6. 104 S. Ct. at 2231-36. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion held that petitioner
stated a cause of action under Title VII because the respondent law firm may have con-
tractually obligated itself to consider petitioner for partnership on her merits. The opin-
ion does not discuss whether law firms are entitled to first amendment protection from
Title VII applicability for any other form of partner selection.
7. Id. at 2232. At King & Spalding, once an associate is passed over for partnership,
the associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere.
8. The author defines "institutional" as analogous to the internal dynamics of a large
corporation consisting of many departments, with minimal managerial control of the
partnership by the individual partners.
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ment and accordingly is within the ambit of Title VII 9 The peti-
tioner also alleged that while recruiting her for employment,
members of the firm made representations that petitioner would
be considered for partnership on a "fair and equal" basis with
the male associates employed by the firm. 10 Respondent law
firm's standard practice is to consider associates for partnership
after their fifth or sixth year with the firm." The Court held
that because the decision to deny petitioner admission to the
partnership affected her employment status with the firm, 2 pe-
titioner's allegations, taken as true, 3 made respondent firm's
consideration of petition for partnership a "term, condition or
privilege' 4 of petitioner's employment and therefore subject to
Title VII protection from discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, religion or national origin.15
The Supreme Court's decision reversed both the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit' and the District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia,' which had held that admission to
a partnership was a decision affecting membership within that
partnership and was not within the scope of Title VII.'5 The ra-
tionale of both courts was that a partnership's decision to ex-
pand its business, including taking on new clients or new part-
ners, is not an employment decision covered by Title VII. 9 Both
courts rejected petitioner's argument that Title VII should apply
to partnership decisions by large, corporate-style law firms like
King & Spalding,'20 even when such decisions have a direct im-
9. Ms. Hishon claimed that "[t]he economic reality of the relationship between a
partner and a large institutional law firm is primarily one of employment in which the
partner earns a livelihood by performing services for clients of the firm." See Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, on Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit, at 13, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
10. 104 S. Ct. at 2232.
11. Id.
12. Id. Pursuant to the firm's "up or out" policy, petitioner was requested to seek
employment elsewhere after having been denied admission to the partnership.
13. Since the Court was adjudicating the sufficiency of petitioner's complaint it as-
sumed her allegations as true, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Id. at 2233.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2234-35.
16. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
17. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
18. 678 F.2d at 1030; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1306-07.
19. 6788 F.2d at 1029; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1304-05.
20. 678 F.2d at 1028; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1304.
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pact on an associate's employment opportunities with the firm.
The Supreme Court's decision to sustain petitioner's claim
under Title VII reflects the traditional posture of the federal
courts to broadly construe Title VII provisions 22 whenever feasi-
ble.2 At the same time, the Supreme Court has a history of re-
jecting claims of freedom of association by non-incorporated
business or professional enterprises, if the Court finds that the
group exercises a pervasive practice of invidious discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, religion or national origin.2' In Hishon
the Court seems to continue its practice of broadly applying Ti-
tle VII when it defines partnership consideration as a "term,
condition or privilege" of an associate's employment in a law
firm. 15
In Hishon the Court determined that because the underly-
ing relationship between the petitioner and respondent was con-
tractual, it followed that the "terms, conditions or privileges" of
employment clearly included benefits which were part of the
contract.2  The Court reasoned that if petitioner's allegations
were true, respondent's promise to consider petitioner for part-
nership on a fair and equal basis was a binding "term" of her
employment contract.27 The Court also found that even if re-
spondent's promise was not binding under the employment con-
tract, an employer may provide its employees with many bene-
fits where there is no contractual obligation to do so.28 Such
benefits, said the Court, may qualify as a "privilege" of employ-
ment for purposes of Title VII protection, and the employer is
therefore prohibited from administering these "privileges" in a
discriminatory fashion.2 e The Court held that the benefit of
partnership consideration is a "privilege" of employment, pro-
21. 678 F.2d at 1028-29; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1306.
22. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
23. See generally Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980); EEOC
v. Hay Associates, 545 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 15 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 1774 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
24. See generally Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); McDonnell-Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 41 U.S. 792 (1973).
25. 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
26. Id. at 2233.





vided petitioner establishes that partnership consideration is di-
rectly linked to her status as an employee of the law firm.30
Both the majority"' and concurring opinions,3 2 however, lim-
ited the Court's application of Title VII to circumstances where
partnership consideration is either an express or implied benefit
of an associate's employment.3 The Court concluded only that
the allegations presented in Hishon,34 if proven, would allow the
respondent firm's partnership admission procedure to fall under
the "terms, conditions or privileges" clause of Title VII.35 The
Court held that Title VII would then apply to all of an associ-
ate's expressed and implied contractual rights which may exist
pursuant to her employment relationship with a law firm.38
What the Court failed to do in Hishon is to define the scope of
an associate's legal rights under Title VII against discriminatory
employment practices by law firms where, unlike Hishon, there
is no allegation that the firm has either a contractual obligation
or has voluntarily assumed an obligation to consider the associ-
ate for partnership. A detailed look at the facts in Hishon and
the judicial history leading up to the Supreme Court opinion
gives some insight into the Court's reasoning behind its decision.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1972, Elizabeth Hishon was hired as an associate by King
& Spalding37 (hereinafter the firm), a partnership comprised of
nearly one hundred attorneys 8 in Atlanta, Georgia. Ms. Hishon
alleged that prior to her employment with the firm, she was told
by a recruiter from King & Spalding that advancement to part-
nership in the firm after five or six years was "a matter of
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2232.
32. Id. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 2234, 2236.
34. Petitioner alleged that the respondent law firm was bound to consider petitioner
for partnership on her merits pursuant to petitioner's employment contract with the
firm. Id. at 2232.
35. Id. at 2233.
36. Id. at 2233-34.
37. King & Spalding was comprised of more than 50 partners and employed approxi-
mately 50 attorneys as associates at the time this lawsuit was filed. Id. at 2232.
38. Id.
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course" for associates who "receive satsifactory evaluations."39
Ms. Hishon also claimed that she was told that all associates
would be considered for partnership on a "fair and equal ba-
sis.''40 Ms. Hishon alleged that she relied upon these representa-
tions in accepting the position offered by the firm.
4 1
In May, 1978, the firm's partners, all of whom were male,
'4 2
considered and denied Ms. Hishon admission to the partner-
ship.4' One year later, the partners reconsidered and again re-
jected Ms. Hishon for admission to the partnership.4 Pursuant
to its "up or out" policy regarding associates,45 the firm notified
Ms. Hishon that she should seek employment elsewhere. ' Her
employment with the firm terminated on December 31, 1979.
4
7
Ms. Hishon was the second woman employed as an associate
by the firm." At the time of her departure, there had never been
a female partner at the firm."9 Along with Ms. Hishon, two male
associates were denied admission to the partnership in 1978.50
Shortly before she left the firm, Ms. Hishon filed a com-







44. Id. at 2232 n.1. The parties in Hishon disputed whether the law firm actually
reconsidered its decision to deny Ms. Hishon admission to the partnership. The law firm
claimed it voted not to reconsider the question and that the 180 day period for Ms.
Hishon to file her claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission com-
menced in May, 1978 and not from the 1979 meeting. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The
Court held that the district court's disposition of the case made it unnecessary to decide
the dispute.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 2232. Once an associate is passed over for partnership at King &
Spalding, the associate is notified to begin seeking employment elsewhere.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 678 F.2d at 1024. The first female attorney hired by King & Spalding was an
associate for 44 years until her retirement in 1977. See also Comment, Hishon v. King &
Spalding: Should Partnership Be Excluded From The Constraints Of Title VII? 1984
DET. C.L. REv. 189, 191 n.8.
49. Comment, supra note 48, at 191 n.8.
50. 678 F.2d at 1024 n.2.
51. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.27-1601.28 (1984). When a charge is filed with the EEOC
for alleged Title VII violations, the Commission may bring a civil action against any
respondent named in a charge, except a government, governmental agency or political
subdivision within 30 days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission.
The Commission may seek a conciliation agreement from the respondent named in the
COMMENTS
(hereinafter EEOC), alleging Title VII violations. 5 After investi-
gating Ms. Hishon's charges against King & Spalding, 3 the
EEOC issued Ms. Hishon a notice of right to sue."' Ms. Hishon
then commenced a private action against the firm.55 King &
Spalding moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that Title
VII did not reach decisions affecting, the status of partners. 6
The main thrust of King & Spalding's argument was that part-
ners are not employees within the meaning of Title VII, 57 and
that partnership consideration is not a "term, condition or privi-
lege" of an associate's employment.58 King & Spalding also ar-
gued that professional partnerships are guaranteed freedom of
association under the first amendment,59 and that Title VII ap-
plication to partnership consideration infringes upon this consti-
tutional right.60
A. The Decisions Below
In ruling on King & Spalding's motion, the district court
specifically examined Ms. Hishon's averment that the firm oper-
ated as "a corporate giant,"61 and that therefore its decisions to
admit partners were similar to promotions of employees to man-
charge which is acceptable to the Commission or the Commission may seek preliminary
or temporary relief pursuant to section 2000e-5(f) of Title VII. The Commission may also
issue the aggrieved party a notice of right to sue if such party requests the issuance. The
Commission will also promptly issue the aggrieved party a notice of right to sue if no
action has been taken by the Commission within 180 days after the filing of the charge.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1982).
53. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1984).
54. Within ten days of filing charges with the EEOC, Ms. Hishon was issued a notice
of right to sue. 104 S. Ct. at 2232.
55. Ms. Hishon commenced her action against King & Spalding in the District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia on February 27, 1980. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2235.
58. Id.
59. Id. King & Spalding did not directly argue the freedom of association issue in its
responding brief to the Court. The Court, however, touched upon the constitutional is-
sues raised in the district court and court of appeals decisions. See generally Respon-
dent's Brief, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
60. 104 S. Ct. at 2235.
61. In both the petition for certiorari and petitioner's brief, Ms. Hishon claimed that
King & Spalding operated as an entity whose existence was perpetual and independent
of the individual partners. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 5; Peti-
tioner's brief at 5, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
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agement positions, which do fall under Title VII. 2 The court
concluded, however, that King & Spalding complied with the
partnership laws of Georgia." Accordingly, the court held that
while associates were indeed employees of the firm, its partners
were not.6 4 The court distinguished the "promotion" of corpo-
rate employees to management-level positions within a corpora-
tion from the "election" of associates to membership in a profes-
sional partnership. 5 The court likened the admission of
associates to a partnership with an election of a corporation's
board of directors. 6 The court also viewed the relationship be-
tween partners of a law firm as peculiar to other business rela-
tionships.6 7 The court stated that:
In a very real sense a professional partnership is like a
marriage. It is, in fact, nothing less than a "business mar-
riage" for better or worse . . . . To use or apply Title VII
to coerce a mismatched or unwanted partnership too
closely resembles a statute for the enforcement of shot-
gun weddings. 6"
The court held that promotions covered by Title VII could not
be extended to include elections of members to private business
associations." The district court accordingly dismissed Ms.
Hishon's complaint.70
In a 2 to 1 decision affirming the dismissal by the district
court,71 the court of appeals agreed with Ms. Hishon that large
law firms possess many attributes common to corporate enter-
prises. The court acknowledged that the size and complexity of
King & Spalding's operations were akin to a corporate entity
62. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304.
63. Id. The district court found King & Spalding to be organized pursuant to all the
requirements under Georgia partnership law, and accordingly rejected petitioner's argu-
ment that King & Spalding's partners were "employees" of the firm for purposes of Title
vii.
64. Id. at 1305.
65. Id. at 1306.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1304.
68. Id. at 1304-05.
69. Id. at 1306-07.
70. Id. at 1307.
71. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982).
72. Id. at 1026.
[Vol. III
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possessing a separate and distinct identity from the individual
partners." Indeed, both the court74 and King & Spalding
75
stated that the Supreme Court had held that partnerships are
separate entities from their partners for a number of legal pur-
poses.76 Nevertheless, the majority rejected the theory that de
facto corporate operation of a partnership transforms the part-
ners into employees of the firm." The majority stated that a
partnership is a "voluntary association, 7 8 and that partners
should be free to select those with whom they will practice law
in the absence of clear evidence of the requisite congressional
intent 79 behind Title VII to interfere in such matters.80 The ma-
jority concluded that Congress did not intend Title VII to define
partnership consideration as an employment practice.8' The
court accordingly upheld the district court's view that partner-
ship admission practices fall outside the scope of Title VII.
a2
Other courts, however, have broadly construed the defini-
tion of employment practice, pursuant to those courts' conclu-
sions that Congress intended Title VII to remedy all kinds of
employment discrimination throughout the private and public
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Although the court states that appellant brings forth the argument that a
partnership has a separate identity from the individual partners, respondent law firm
admitted such in its brief before the district court. See 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1304.
76. 678 F.2d at 1026. The Supreme Court has also held that partnerships have sepa-
rate identities from its partners in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See Brief
of the Women's Bar Association of Massachusetts as Amicus Curiae at 14-24, Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
77. 678 F.2d at 1026. The court rejected Ms. Hishon's contention regarding the legal
status of the King & Spalding internal structure. The court stated that King & Spalding
reduced its partnership structure to writing in accordance with Georgia state law and has
not incorporated the partnership merely by operating as a corporation.
78. Id. at 1028.
79. Id. at 1027.
80. Id. at 1028.
81. Id. at 1027. The court acknowledged Ms. Hishon's argument that the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that part ownership of a business does not pre-
clude a person's classification as an employee subject to federal employment legislation.
See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Pettway v. Amer-
ican Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). The court, however, held that these
decisions did not make the term "partner" equivalent to the term "employer" for pur-
poses of Title VII. See Burke v. Friedman, 566 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
82. 678 F.2d at 1030. The court stated that a cause of action for unlawful discharge
under Title VII has a separate identity from termination resulting from a partnership
decision that falls outside the scope of Title VII.
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sectors.08 The rationale behind such a broad interpretation of
Title VII's purpose is, ironically, the lack of specificity in the
statutory language and legislative history of the Act.84 The fifth
circuit in particular has determined that Congress' "failure to
enumerate specific discriminatory practices was a conscious ef-
fort to give the courts wide latitude in construing Title VII
[since] constant change is the order of the day and [therefore]
seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily become
the injustices of the morrow."s In Teal v. Connecticut,8 the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressed its belief that
Congress intended Title VII to prohibit the consequences of em-
ployment practices, not simply the motivation behind them.
87
The Second Circuit construed Title VII as invalidating employ-
ment practices that, although neutral on their face, have a dis-
parate impact on a class protected by the Act. 8 In Bonilla v.
Oakland Scavenger Co.,"e the Ninth Circuit held that the right
to be considered for promotion on a non-discriminatory basis is
covered by federal employment legislation, even if the employee
would not be covered after the promotion."
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII
Additional evidence of the congressional intent behind Title
VII lies in the legislative history of the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 197291 (hereinafter the Act). Prior to passage of
the Act, Congress recognized that the enforcement machinery
83. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Parham v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone, 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
84. Comment, supra note 48, at 194.
85. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), reprinted in Comment, supra
note 48, at 194-95.
86. 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1982).
87. Id. at 136 n.5.
88. Id. at 137, 140.
89. 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
90. Id.
91. 42 U.$.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1982). The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
amended a number of provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In particu-
lar, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 was amended to broaden the Commission's power to issue cease
and desist orders and commence civil actions against employers found to have engaged
in a "pattern or practice" of discrimination in violation of the Act.
[Vol. III
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created by the Civil Rights Act of 19642 inadequately provided
for equal employment opportunities for minorities and women."
Despite the broad application of Title VII by the courts,9 com-
plaints of employment discrimination were steadily rising."
Congress accordingly broadened the enforcement powers of the
EEOC under the Act96 in order to assist the courts in enjoining
still widespread practices of overt and covert employment dis-
crimination in both the private and public sectors. 7
In its report to Congress, the House Education and Labor
Committee stated that the particular problem of sex discrimina-
tion was a special concern behind the Act's provisions. 8 The
Committee found that "women are subject to economic depriva-
tion as a class,"'9 and that their self-fulfillment and develop-
ment were frustrated by discrimination on the basis of their
sex.100 The Committee's report concluded that job discrimina-
tion of any kind must end once and for all, "to insure every citi-
zen the opportunity for the decent self-respect that accompanies
a job commensurate with one's abilities."
101
Although the legislative history indicates that Title VII
should be a measure designed to do away with all forms of invid-
ious employment discrimination,0 2 the statutory language of Ti-
tle VII, as amended by the Act, contains a number of limita-
92. Prior to the amendments to Title VII in 1972 the House Education and Labor
Committee noted that one of the basic problems with the enforcement procedures cre-
ated by the 1964 Act was that the EEOC was unable to administer cease and desist
orders against violators of Title VII. This meant that the EEOC either had to fully liti-
gate Title VII claims itself or issue the aggrieved party a private right to sue by the
EEOC. See House Report No. 92-238 on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, P.L. 92-261, reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2139-48, 92nd
Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
93. Id. at 2140.
94. See Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 2140, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
96. Id. at 2148.
97. Id. at 2146-47.
98. Id. at 2140.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2141.
102. The Federal court's broad interpretation of Title VII is primarily based on the
remedial purpose of the Act to root out invidious employment discrimination. See House
Report No. 92-238, supra note 92.
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tions.1 3 Title VII prohibits discrimination only by employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations.104 The statute
defines an employer as a person or entity (including partner-
ships)10 5 "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceeding cal-
endar year."'106 In addition, Title VII does not apply to "employ-
ees" who are either elected or appointed to public office10 7 or
who are employed as an advisor to a public official. 08 There is
little else either in the statute itself, or in any related legislative
or administrative 9 document that defines an "employee" for
purposes of Title VII. Hence the courts, in grappling with cases
similar to Hishon,"0 must weigh concerns which warrant a broad
application of Title VII against constitutional concerns that in-
dividuals be free to form private business associations for their
mutual benefit.
IV. SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SCOPE OF TITLE VII
The Supreme Court has historically given a liberal interpre-
tation to Title VII in order to best serve the Act's remedial pur-
poses."' In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc.,"2 the
Court stated that:
[I]n enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever
form which create inequality in employment opportunity
due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex or
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a)-(f) (1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(b)(c).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(b)(c).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
108. Id.
109. The EEOC guidelines on enforcement of Title VII refer to "employees" in the
same generic way as the statute does. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.27-.28 (1984).
110. There are a number of variations to the facts in Hishon which would fall outside
the Court's narrow holding upholding a Title VII action. One example is a firm's express
refusal to consider certain associate positions for partnership. Law firms could merely
classify associate positions in order to circumvent the Title VII implications of the
Hishon decision.
111. See Teal v. Connecticut 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
112. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
[Vol. III
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national origin ... and [Congress] ordained that its pol-
icy of outlawing such discrimination should have its
"highest priority."' 8
In Teal v. Connecticut,1 4 the Court also concluded that,
"Congress required the removal of artificial, arbitrary and un-
necessary barriers to employment and professional development
that had historically been encountered by women, blacks and
other minorities."
'"1 5
Accordingly, there has been little, if any, precedent by the
Court for a narrow application of Title VII concerning discrimi-
natory employment practices in a wide variety of occupations
and trades. Indeed, a case decided in 1977 by the District Court
for the Southern District of New York"' seemed to foreshadow
a different result than that which the Court arrived at in
Hishon.
V. THE Lucido CASE
In Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore,"17 the court held
that an associate is an employee of a law firm for purposes of
Title VII."'5 The Lucido court had previously recognized a cause
of action under Title VII for a law firm's discriminatory hiring
practices which denied associate positions to female applicants
with disparately superior qualifications as compared to the
males hired by the firm." 9 In Lucido, an associate already hired
by a law firm stated a claim under Title VII against the firm for
its alleged refusal to make the associate a partner on the basis of
the associate's national origin and religion.'20
The facts and legal issues presented in Lucido were quite
similar to those in Hishon.'2' Lucido was an associate at a pres-
113. Id. at 763.
114. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
115. Id. at 448.
116. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1774 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Kohn v. Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
120. 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. Many of the legal arguments presented by Mr. Lucido to the district court were
virtually identical to those submitted by Ms. Hishon in her petition for certiorari. See
Petitioner's brief, supra note 61, at 11, 14, 15, 25, 43, 48.
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tigious New York City law firm for approximately six years,122
when he was considered for and subsequently denied admission
to the firm's partnership. 128 Pursuant to Cravath's "up or out"
policy, Lucido was notified of the firm's decision and shortly
thereafter left the firm.1 24 After leaving the firm, Lucido brought
an action under Title VII, alleging that the firm refused to make
him a partner because he was Italian and Catholic.'2 Lucido
also claimed that while he was employed at the firm, the firm
refused to give him responsibilities which would have prepared
him to become a partner because he was Italian and Catholic.'26
Like King & Spalding, Cravath argued that a law firm or-
ganized as a partnership is a business association which is free to
choose new members pursuant to the first amendment.
27
Cravath also argued that neither partners nor the process of se-
lecting partners for partnership fell within the scope of Title
VII.12 8
The Lucido court found that while partners were not con-
sidered Title VII employees of a law firm, 2 e partnership consid-
eration at Cravath was by its nature'8 0 a "term, condition or
privilege" of an associate's employment. "' The Lucido court
also determined that partnership consideration is an opportu-
nity for promotion within a law firm. 3 2 The court concluded
that although opportunities for promotion are not covered by
Title VII, Title VII nevertheless prohibits discrimination once
the promotion process is undertaken by the firm. 88
In response to Cravath's argument that a partnership com-
prised of attorneys is afforded the first amendment protection of





127. Id. at 126.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 128.
130. Id. The court found that Cravath's policy to consider all its associates for part-
nership was "part and parcel" of an associate's status as an employee of the firm.
131. Id. at 128. The Lucido court concluded that Cravath's policy to consider all of
its associates for partnership after a certain number of years made the opportunity to be





freedom of association," the court stated that even if Cravath's
position were correct, no first amendment rights would be vio-
lated by applying Title VII to the procedures Cravath volunta-
rily implemented for promoting associates to the partnership.
35
The court also held that applying Title VII to a business organi-
zation the size of Cravath" 6 did not infringe upon the individual
partner's right to freedom of association.3 7 The court concluded
that since Cravath operated its business as if it were a corpora-
tion, 3 8 Cravath's first amendment defense would, if successful,
operate as a pretext for discriminatory employment practices in
violation of Title VII.8 9 Accordingly, the court held that Lucido
stated a cause of action under Title VII.'" Cravath did not ap-
peal the decision.1
4 '
Lucido, however, had not been generally accepted prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon."' The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, in its Hishon decision, upheld the district court's view that
partnership consideration is a process more similar to an "elec-
tion" than a "promotion.' ' 4 3 In Burks v. Friedman,'" the sev-
enth circuit held that partners were not employees and therefore
their selection was not protected by Title VII.'"
VI. THE Hishon OPINION
The Supreme Court's decision in Hishon supports the
Lucido court's application of Title VII to partnership admission
in a law firm." 6 The Court, however, limited the scope of Title
VII to the extent of Ms. Hishon's status as an employee of King
134. Id. at 129.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 128. Cravath, Swaine & Moore was comprised of approximately 178 attor-




140. Id. at 130.
141. There is no record of an appeal from the district court's decision in Lucido.
142. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982); Burke v. Fried-
man, 566 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
143. 678 F.2d 1028; 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1306.
144. 566 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
145. Id. at 869.
146. See generally Hishon, 104 S. Ct. 2229; Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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& Spalding." " The Court did not follow the "promotion" theory
expounded by the Lucido court. "1 8 Instead, the Court considered
Title VII to apply in Hishon because partnership consideration
was either a "term, condition or privilege" of Ms. Hishon's em-
ployment, or it was an express contractual obligation undertaken
by King & Spalding.'4 9 The Court also did not dismiss King &
Spalding's first amendment defense' on the ground that King &
Spalding operated as a de facto corporation, as was done in
Lucido.'5 0 Indeed, the determinative issue behind the Court's
holding in Hishon is whether a promise for partnership consid-
eration was made by the law firm. '51 Since the Court was decid-
ing upon the sufficiency of Ms. Hishon's complaint, it assumed
that a promise had been made.' This assumption by the Court
significantly narrows the scope of the Hishon decision as it ap-
plies to Title VII.' 8 Indeed, both the majority' 54 and concurring
opinions 155 leave the impression that but for the alleged prom-
ise by King & Spalding to Ms. Hishon, the Court may have af-
firmed the decisions below.
A. Cause of Action Stated Under Title VII
The Court stated that Ms. Hishon has a right to sue under
Title VII, independent of the promise allegedly made by King &
Spalding.'" Yet the Court also narrowly construed this right by
tying it to King & Spalding's policy to consider all of its associ-
ates for partnership after being employed with the firm for a
147. 104 S. Ct. at 2233-34.
148. 425 F. Supp at 128. The court in Lucido determined that partnership considera-
tion can be considered an opportunity for promotion within a law firm. The court based
its conclusion on the theory that Cravath operated as a de facto corporation.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 2234.
150. Id. at 2235.
151. Id. at 2232, 2234.
152. Id. at 2233.
153. Id. The Court stated that partnership consideration could fall under Title VII as
a benefit which becomes an "incident" of employment, independent of King & Spald-
ing's express promise to consider Ms. Hishon for partnership on a "fair and equal basis."
Yet, the Court based its conclusion on the fact that King & Spalding's "up or out" policy
enabled the prospect of partnership to play a significant role in an associate's employ-
ment status with the firm. Id. at 2234.
154. Id. at 2232-34.
155. Id. at 2236-37.
156. Id. at 2234.
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specified period of time.1 57 The Court held that the policy, vol-
untarily instituted by King & Spalding, might constitute a
"privilege" or "benefit" of employment independent of contrac-
tual obligations to the associates. " The Court also reasoned
that Title VII prohibits employers from granting or withholding
voluntary benefits in a discriminatory fashion, " when they be-
come "part and parcel" of an associate's status with the firm. 160
B. Right to Freedom of Association
Both the district court"' and court of appeals 162 addressed
their concern that professional partnerships have a constitu-
tional right of freedom of association which cannot be circum-
scribed by federal legislation. The Court, however, did not di-
rectly address King & Spalding's claim that applying Title VII
to partnership consideration under any circumstances infringes
upon the firm's constitutional right of free association.'63 The
Court acknowledged only that lawyers have traditionally been
afforded freedom of expression.' 6 4 The Court concluded, more-
over, that freedom of expression is not compromised (in this
case) by requiring King & Spalding to consider Ms. Hishon for
partnership on her merits.165 The Court tersely stated that pro-
fessional associations do not possess any rights denied other em-
ployers to engage in practices of invidious employment
discrimination.'
157. Id. See also id. at 2236 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2234.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1306-07.
162. 678 F.2d at 1028-29.
163. 104 S. Ct. at 2235-36.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. The Court cited its decision in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 470 (1973) to
support the contention that discrimination in violation of Title VII characterized as free-
dom of association fails to raise a constitutional issue. The Court, however, does not
reach the question of whether King & Spalding's partnership selection process would
violate Title VII if Ms. Hishon's allegations of breach of contract did not exist.
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C. THE CONCURRING OPINION
While the Court's dicta in Hishon indicate that the Court
may be willing to broadly apply Title VII to future cases involv-
ing partner selection by law firms,"" Justice Powell's concurring
opinion'6 8 cautions the reader not to interpret the majority's de-
cision so liberally.
169
Justice Powell stated that he does not read the majority
opinion in Hishon to extend Title VII to the management of a
law firm.17 0 A partnership, he reasoned, is a shared enterprise.
1 7'
By common agreement, partners must make the judgments and
sensitive decisions important to the partnership generally and to
the partners individually.1
72
The underlying theme in Powell's concurrence is the major-
ity's limited application of Title VII to the facts in Hishon.17
Justice Powell, in defending a limited application of Title VII,
stated that the partners of a law firm are entitled to allocate the
duties and profits of the firm as they collectively choose. 17  Jus-
tice Powell also stated that the partners, being in charge of the
general management of the firm, are entitled to make policy de-
cisions such as taking on new clients, new employees, and new
partners with minimal interference.
17 5
VII. CONCLUSION
Although Justice Powell agreed with the result reached in
Hishon, it is clear that he construed Title VII applicability to
167. Id. at 2234-36.
168. Id. at 2236-37.
169. Id. at 2236.
170. Justice Powell stated, "I write to make clear my understanding that the Court's
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the management of a law firm by its
partners. . . .The relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between
employer and employee-including that between the partnership and its associates." Id.
at 2236. Justice Powell, however, concurred in the majority opinion for the following
reason: "here it is alleged that [King & Spalding] as an employer is obligated by contract
to consider petitioner for partnership on equal terms without regard to sex. I agree that
enforcement of this obligation, voluntarily assumed, would impair no right of associa-
tion." Id. (emphasis added). See also id. at 2236-37 n.4.
171. Id. at 2236.
172. Id.
173. Id. See also supra note 169.




partnership admission procedures even more narrowly than the
majority.'7 6 Under Justice Powell's analysis, in the absence of an
explicit contractual obligation to the contrary,'" Title VII would
not apply to the selection of partners by law firms, because the
first amendment secures the right of partnerships to choose its
own members free from outside interference.' 8
The question never reached by the majority in Hishon, how-
ever, is whether Title VII applies to partnership decisions by law
firms which neither promise an associate to consider him or her
for partnership, nor have a policy to consider all its associates
for partnership. In Hishon, the Court seems to assume that it is
the general practice of law firms to have partnership admission
procedures similar to those of King & Spalding.'79 Even if the
Court's assumption is correct, will law fims, in the wake of
Hishon, change their partnership admission policies in order to
thwart future Title VII suits? Perhaps an even more compelling
question is why should the Court treat large, corporate-style
managed'80 law firms differently from other employers who re-
cruit people for top-level management positions? If partners in a
law firm are so different from executives in a corporation, then
should the Court apply Title VII provisions to partnership ad-
mission under any circumstances? The answers to these ques-
tions lie perhaps more in the Court's reluctance to radically alter
the internal dynamics of the traditional law firm, than its reluc-
tance to handle first amendment objections to Title VII.
The Court's narrow holding in Hishon, however, may never-
176. Justice Powell acknowledged that, "'invidious private discrimination . . . has
never been afforded affirmative constitutional protections' . . . This is not to say, how-
ever, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always be without costs to
other values, including constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of per-
sonal judgment in choosing one's associates or colleagues." Id. at 2236 n.4.
177. Id. at 2236. Justice Powell stated that respondent law firm's constitutional ob-
jections to the Court's application of Title VII in this case were unfounded as it was
alleged by Ms. Hishon that the firm had a contractual obligation to consider her for
partnership.
178. Id. at 2236 n.4.
179. A great many law firms do not select a majority of their new partners from
among the associates employed by the firm. Many law firms primarily seek outside attor-
neys who can bring new ideas and new clients to the firm. See Altman & Weil, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT §§ 2.09, 12.09 (Mathew Bender ed. 1981).
180. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that many large
firms have management schemes similar to those of corporations. 678 F.2d 1026. See also
Altman & Weil, supra, note 179, §§ 2.05(3), 2.08.
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theless have a great and broad impact on future cases involving
discrimination in the partner selection process. One basis for
such a conclusion is the Court's rejection of King & Spalding's
contention that, because elevation to partner entails a change in
status from being an associate "employed" by the firm to be-
coming an "employer" and "owner" of the firm,18' partnership
consideration cannot be a "term, condition or privilege" of em-
ployment.18 2 The Court agreed with the Lucido court's determi-
nation that a change in an associate's status as a result of admis-
sion to the partnership is independent from the associate's
privilege to be considered for partnership by the existing part-
ners.'8 s Accordingly, the Court would seemingly disregard the
change in status from "employee" to "employer" in any future
Title VII case concerning partner selection.
Yet, if one interprets the concurring opinion by Justice
Powell as clarifying the dicta found in the majority opinion,
then the Hishon decision does virtually nothing but apply Title
VII to a very narrow set of facts. Since the Court declined to
decide whether partner selection is protected from Congressional
interference by the first amendment,' 8 4 law firms which do not
voluntarily obligate themselves to consider all their associates
for partnership are unaffected by Hishon.18 5 In addition, any law
firm which chooses to abandon partner selection policies similar
to those of King & Spalding can conceivably choose partners on
the basis of race or sex with impunity.
181. 104 S. Ct. at 2235. King & Spalding's argument in essence was that an associate,
once admitted to the partnership, is no longer an employee for purposes of Title VII and
hence consideration for that admission is not an employment practice covered by the act.
182. Id.
183. Id. It should be pointed out that the Court did not expressly agree with the
analysis of Lucido on this issue, but that the author draws this conclusion by comparing
both decisions.
184. Id. The Court stated that there was no infringement of King & Spalding's free-
dom of association in upholding a cause of action under Title VII for Ms. Hishon. The
Court, however, based its conclusion on King & Spalding's inability to demonstrate that
the function of a professional partnership would be inhibited by a contractual require-
ment to consider Ms. Hishon for partnership on her merits.
185. Id. at 2235 n.10 & 2236 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
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A. Title VII and the Lawyer's Need to Freely Associate
The Hishon decision is also significant in that the Court has
recognized the need for attorneys to be able to freely form and
manage partnerships in order to efficiently pool their profes-
sional resources.' Indeed, even the most liberal reading of Title
VII does not support its application in situations where two or
more attorneys choose to form a partnership for their mutual
benefit.
187
On the other hand, the enormous growth of the legal profes-
sion and the increasing number of large law firms across the na-
tion 88 are realities which mandate a more thorough examination
of the problem of discrimination in partner selection than the
Court gave in Hishon. Although primarily structured as partner-
ships, most law firms as large and diverse as King & Spalding
operate essentially as corporations.' 8 ' The duties of a partner in
a large law firm are akin to those of a management executive in
a corporation."s0
While the legal profession has been growing steadily over
the past few decades, women and minorities have been entering
the profession in increasing numbers annually.'" Yet today,
women and minorities are still by and large inadequately repre-
sented in the partnerships of many of the largest and most pres-
tigious law firms across the nation."' While this lack of propor-
186. Id. at 2235. The Court recognized that the activities of lawyers may make a
distinctive contribution to the ideas and beliefs of our society. Therefore the courts may
accommodate a law firm's distinctive need for free association whenever legally feasible.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
188. In 1982, the law firms included in the National Law Journal's list of the top 200
law firms employed a total of 16,683 associates. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 9, at 26.
189. Altman & Weil, supra note 179, at § 2.05(3).
190. Id. at §§ 2.05(3), 2.08.
191. At Harvard Law School, 38 percent of the 1983 graduating class was female,
compared to only 13 percent in 1974. Abramson & Franklin, Harvard Law '74: Are
Women Catching Up? AM. LAw. 79 (May 1983). Despite the objective evidence that
women are as well qualified as men to practice law, women made up only 12.8% of the
total number employed as lawyers or judges in the legal profession in 1980. "The large
percentage of these women were employed as associates in law firms." See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 27-28. See also U.S. Bureau of Census Statistical
Abstract of the United States 402, Chart No. 676 (105th ed. 1985).
192. Abramson & Franklin, supra note 191, at 79. Nine years after their graduation,
only 23% of the women in the '74 class of Harvard Law had made partner in a law firm
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tional representation is not conclusive evidence that women and
minorities are discriminated against in the partner selection pro-
cess, the Hishon decision, in the author's opinion, fails to guar-
antee Title VII protection against such discrimination in the
future.
B. A Possible Solution
In the absence of an authoritative directive by the Court,
the time has come for Congress to amend Title VII to include all
personnel-related decisions made by business and professional
associations run for profit.193 At the very least, such legislation
will likely force before the Court the issue of whether law firms
and other partnershps can claim an exemption to Title VII
under the first amendment. The Court will then have to decide
the legal issue it chose to leave for another day in Hishon.
Jeffrey J. Rea
compared to 51% of the males, despite the fact that nearly equal percentages of both
women and men sought careers in private practice.
193. The ambiguity of the term "employee" under Title VII mandates some sort of
qualification by Congress if its intent to do away with employment discrimination in all
sectors of society is ever to be realized. A great many service and professional positions
today no longer fit the traditional employer-employee relationship of the industrial era
factory.
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